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I.	Introduction

FDR and Chief Justice Hughes: The President, the Supreme Court, and the Epic Battle
over the New Deal is James F. Simon’s dual biography of the two major figures who
battled over the constitutional visions of the New Deal and the Old Order.1 It is
Simon’s third dual biography of the contentious relationships between a new
President and a sitting Chief Justice of the other political party.2
Simon began with Thomas Jefferson and Chief Justice John Marshall, two distantly
related Virginia aristocrats who despised each other. Notwithstanding Jefferson’s
popularity, Marshall prevailed in their major disputes. To be sure, William Marbury
never received his “vested” commission, but Jefferson was on the receiving end of a
lecture about the need for “a government of laws, and not of men.”3 Associate Justice
Samuel Chase was impeached in an effort initiated by Jefferson, but not convicted.4
Aaron Burr’s trial for treason, so aggressively championed by Jefferson and presided
over by Marshall, resulted in a directed acquittal.5 And a decade after his presidency,
Jefferson gasped at the nationalism of Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland.6
Simon followed with Abraham Lincoln, the antislavery Republican who had risen
from poverty to become a successful lawyer-politician, and Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney, the Jacksonian Maryland aristocrat who had freed his own slaves but authored
Dred Scott v. Sandford.7 Lincoln came to national prominence because of Dred Scott,
which Lincoln claimed was part of a conspiracy between Taney, James Buchanan,
Franklin Pierce, and Stephen Douglas to nationalize slavery.8 Like Jefferson and
Marshall, Lincoln and Taney held decidedly different visions of the country. Lincoln
saw a Nation, while Taney hoped for an amicable divorce between North and South—
or, failing that, a short successful war for Southern independence. They clashed
directly only once, when Lincoln refused to accede to Taney’s issuance of a writ of

1.

James F. Simon, Fdr and Chief Justice Hughes: The President, the Supreme Court, and the
Epic Battle over the New Deal (2012).

2.

See James F. Simon, Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney: Slavery, Secession, and the President’s
War Powers (2006); James F. Simon, What Kind of Nation: Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall,
and the Epic Struggle to Create a United States (2002) [hereinafter Simon, What Kind of
Nation].

3.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162–63 (1803).

4.

Simon, What Kind of Nation, supra note 2, at 197–219; Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A
History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815, at 422–24 (2009). The failure of the U.S. Senate to
convict Chase ended the idea of impeaching Justices simply because elected officials disagreed with
their decisions. Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford both attempted to revive the idea and impeach liberal
Justice William O. Douglas in 1953 and 1970, respectively, but their efforts went nowhere.

5.

See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693).

6.

See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

7.

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).

8.

2 Abraham Lincoln, “A House Divided”: Speech at Spring field, Illinois, in The Collected Works of
Abraham Lincoln 465 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953).
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habeas corpus to John Merryman.9 On the only war measure that came before the
Court during the Civil War, Taney joined dissenters claiming Lincoln’s blockade of
Confederate ports was illegal.10 Taney would also have held all of the key Union war
measures—the income tax, the draft, greenbacks—unconstitutional. He died at the
age of eighty-eight just before Lincoln’s reelection; had he died at eighty, before Dred
Scott, his record would have looked so much better.
With Marshall’s win over Jefferson, followed by Lincoln’s sweep of Taney, FDR
and Chief Justice Hughes could be seen as Simon’s tie-breaker in Supreme CourtPresident battles. Yet the battles of the 1930s were a draw. With the failure of FDR’s
Court-packing plan, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes kept his independent
Court. But in the aftermath of the Court-packing plan, Franklin D. Roosevelt got
the judicial seal of approval on all his New Deal measures. Still, the failure of the
Court-packing plan was costly. FDR’s refusal to compromise squandered his 1936
landslide and sucked the wind out of the New Deal.
There are multiple biographies of FDR and studies of the New Deal, as well as
two very recent books on the Court-packing controversy.11 Hughes, however, is
decidedly less well known.12 There is a two-volume authorized biography13 (now six
decades old), Hughes’s own autobiographical notes,14 chapters in a few anthologies,
and entries in encyclopedias, but that is it. Simon gives us a modern Hughes, an
accurate depiction of FDR, and then, later, their interactions during the New Deal.
There is real value in James Simon’s four hundred pages because Simon, who began
his career as a reporter, understands the appeal of a good story. What follows is
Simon’s description of Hughes’s career before he became Chief Justice, President
Roosevelt’s reactions to the Court’s rulings blocking his New Deal, the clash over
FDR’s Court-packing plan, and the aftermath of the plan’s defeat.
II.	Introducing Charles Evans Hughes

For those unaware of Hughes’s life, it is stunning to realize how impressive his
resume was by the time Herbert Hoover nominated him to be Chief Justice at just
under the age of 68. Hughes was the third man to have previously resigned from the
Court only to be later nominated for the higher office of Chief Justice. Of the three,
he was also the only nominee to actually be confirmed; John Rutledge was defeated
in the Senate, and John Jay declined the nomination.

9.

See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).

10.

See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).

11.

Jeff Shesol, Supreme Power: Franklin Roosevelt vs. the Supreme Court (2010); Burt Solomon,
Fdr v. the Constitution: The Court-Packing Fight and the Triumph of Democracy (2009).

12.

One of my jurisprudentially-oriented constitutional law colleagues admitted he knew nothing of Hughes.

13.

Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes (1951).

14.

The Autobiographic Notes of Charles Evans Hughes (David J. Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin
eds., 1973).
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Hughes was the only child of an immigrant Welsh minister and a strong-willed
American mother. He was a prodigy from the age of three and excelled both in
school and then in the practice of law. But the tedium of the latter often bored him,
and after the turn of the century he accepted the job of independent counsel to
legislative investigations of the gas utilities and life insurance industries. In both
cases his meticulous work and questioning exposed major financial improprieties.
The work propelled him into the governorship of New York, where he pushed a
recalcitrant legislature into “labor reforms, strengthening executive oversight of
factory conditions and supporting legislation regulating child labor and providing
additional safety protection for workers.”15
Hughes declined William Howard Taft’s invitation to be vice president and
instead won reelection as governor, but his second term was less successful than his
first and he gladly accepted Taft’s appointment to the Supreme Court in 1910, gaining
unanimous Senate approval. Shortly thereafter, Chief Justice Melville Weston Fuller
died. Because Taft claimed to admire Hughes more than any other man and had
expressed a desire to make him Chief Justice, when the White House called to invite
Hughes to meet with the President, Hughes could assume promotion was coming.
But a half hour later a second call came cancelling the meeting. The next day Taft
promoted a sitting Justice, the sixty-six-year-old former Confederate Edward White
to Chief Justice. We do not know exactly why Taft changed his mind; perhaps Taft
wanted the office to become vacant again when his presidency was over, because it
was clear that he would prefer being Chief Justice to being President.
III.	Associate Justice Hughes

Despite Oliver Wendell Holmes’s towering reputation, Hughes was the most
liberal Justice on the Court during his initial tenure because of the former’s blind spot
on race. On the economic front, Hughes wrote the opinion of the Court in both the
Minnesota Rate Cases16 and Houston E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport
Rate Case).17 The former upheld a state railroad rate order that had the effect of
lowering interstate rates—when there had been no previous federal regulation of those
rates.18 More importantly, the latter upheld a federal rate order that overturned a state
rate order that operated entirely within the state of Texas. The Texas Railroad
Commission had set rates between Dallas and Houston to eastern Texas that were
lower than the rates from Shreveport to the same destinations. In upholding the
federal order, Hughes ruled that the federal government could regulate intrastate
activity that had a “close and substantial” relation to interstate commerce.19

15.

Simon, supra note 1, at 41.

16.

Simpson v. Shepard (Minn. Rate Cases), 230 U.S. 352 (1913).

17.

234 U.S. 342 (1914).

18.

See Minn. Rate Cases, 230 U.S. at 433.

19.

Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351.
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Hughes also cast two important votes in liberty of contract cases. In Coppage v.
Kansas, the Court struck down a ban on yellow dog contracts (whereby an employee
agrees not to join a union on penalty of immediate dismissal) in an opinion celebrating
the inequalities that flow from the ability to contract freely. 20 Hughes joined Holmes’s
dissent, which would have allowed the state to prevent an employer from overreaching
in this manner. But in an opinion implementing the positive side of freedom of
contract, Hughes, writing for the Court, struck down an Arizona law that required
employers of five or more workers to have at least eighty percent of their workforce be
American citizens and had caused an Austrian immigrant to be laid off.21 Hughes
found the law violated the equal protection rights of lawful resident aliens.
Striking down that discriminatory Arizona law was an illustration of Hughes’s
lifelong commitment to civil rights and civil liberties. In Bailey v. Alabama, he wrote
for the Court in striking down a state law that deemed it fraud for an employee to
take an advance and subsequently quit the job without being able to repay the
advance.22 Alonzo Bailey had received a $15 advance on a contract to work for $12 a
month for a year. A few days into his second month, he quit. Unable to repay the
advance, he was convicted and sentenced to 136 days at hard labor. Hughes wrote,
“The State may impose involuntary servitude as a punishment for a crime, but it may
not compel one man to labor for another in payment of debt, by punishing him as a
criminal if he does not perform the service.”23 Similarly, Hughes joined a subsequent
opinion of the Court striking down Alabama’s criminal surety law, which allowed
employers to pay a defendant’s fine for minor crimes—“Negro crimes” like
vagrancy—and then compel the defendant to work off the fine.24
Hughes again wrote for the Court in striking down an Oklahoma law that
required railroads to provide luxury cars for whites but not for blacks. He tersely
rejected the claim that too few blacks could afford a luxury car ticket: “[T]he
constitutional right [could not] depend upon the number of persons who may be
discriminated against.”25 This foreshadowed Hughes’s response as Chief Justice to a
complaint by the Court’s marshal that blacks were eating in the Court’s cafeteria:
The marshal was told to go outside and read the words emblazoned on the Court’s
new building—“Equal Justice Under Law”—and that if he did not understand the
words, he would be replaced.26
Finally, Hughes joined a Holmes dissent when the Court denied a habeas trial to
Leo Frank, a New York Jew who managed a pencil factory in Georgia. Frank was
convicted of murdering a thirteen-year-old female employee, but the facts showed a
20. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
21.

Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).

22.

219 U.S. 219 (1910).

23.

Id. at 244.

24.

United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914).

25.

McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161 (1914).

26. Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Supreme Court and the American Elite, 1789–2008, at 188 (2009).
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mob-dominated courtroom where the trial judge did nothing to maintain order. The
majority found the Georgia Supreme Court’s rejection of the mob domination claim
sufficient.27 The dissent asserted a duty “to declare lynch law as little valid when
practiced by a regular drawn jury as when administered by one elected by a mob
intent upon death.”28
IV.	Hughes Off the Court

Hughes’s career on the Court was cut short when he became the subject of a true
draft to become the Republican presidential candidate in 1916. Other Justices had hoped
to become President—John McLean and Salmon Chase hungered for it in the nineteenth
century and Hugo L. Black and William O. Douglas hoped for it in the 1940s—but only
Hughes got the nomination. And the kicker was, he wanted no part of it.
Republicans had been split since Theodore Roosevelt declared the War of 1912
on Taft, his chosen successor.29 In 1916, Taft believed that Hughes was the only
candidate who could unite Republicans.
You will certainly be elected if you accept the nomination and you will reunite
the only party from which constructive progress can be expected at a most
critical time in the country’s history . . . . Strong men will respond to your call
because you are yourself so satisfying in strength and in your political courage
and patriotism.30

When the Republicans nominated him on the third ballot by a landslide, Hughes
tearfully resigned from the Court. “I was torn between two profound desires,” he
later recalled, “one to keep the judicial ermine unsullied, and the other not to fail in
meeting what might be a duty to the country.”31
Hughes should have won, but he was not a good candidate—Theodore Roosevelt
called him a “bearded iceberg”32—and bungled California. To put Hughes’s failure
into context, Republican Governor Hiram Johnson won a Californian Senate seat by
300,000 votes while Hughes lost the state (and the presidency) by only 4000 votes.
Defeated, Hughes moved back to New York City and the practice—the very
lucrative practice—of law. Yet he always found time for public service. Hughes
actively supported the war effort once President Woodrow Wilson broke his pledge
to keep the country out of war. In addition to heading the city’s draft board, at
Wilson’s request he led an investigation of the aircraft industry. The New York Times
27.

See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).

28. Id. at 350 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
29. Theodore Roosevelt had supported Taft for the 1908 Republican nomination, but became frustrated

with Taft’s performance and decided to run against him in the 1912 Republican primaries. This led to
a disastrous and ignominious defeat and created a rift within the party. Patricia O’Toole, The War of
1912, Time (June 25, 2006), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1207791,00.html.

30. Simon, supra note 1, at 96.
31.

Id. at 97.

32.

Id. at 100.
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lauded his report: “There has never been a more searching and thorough investigation
under the direction of the Government.”33
During the Red Scare immediately after World War I, five Socialist members of
the New York legislature had been ousted for their views. Hughes, acting pro bono,
came to their defense, writing to the speaker of the Assembly within forty-eight
hours of the action:
If there was anything against these men as individuals, if they were deemed
to be guilty of criminal offenses, they should have been charged accordingly.
But I understand that the action is not directed against these five elected
members as individuals but that the proceeding is virtually an attempt to
indict a political party and deny it representation in the Legislature. This is
not, in my judgment, American government. 34

With Republicans looking dominant in 1920, the presidency could have been
Hughes’s. Many prominent Republicans wanted him as the standard-bearer, but
when a Republican delegation came to him, he stated, “I beg of you to believe me.
Since our daughter died, Mrs. Hughes and I are heartbroken. I don’t want to be
president of the United States. I request that my name not even be mentioned in the
convention.” 35 Nevertheless, after Warren Harding won the presidency, Hughes
accepted the prime cabinet position: Secretary of State.
Although Hughes favored joining the League of Nations, President Warren
Harding, six weeks into his administration, came down against it. Later, Hughes
was equally unsuccessful in getting the United States to join the International Court
of Justice. His principal foreign policy success was the Washington Naval Conference
in 1922 for which, as always, he was meticulously prepared, with specific ships to be
scuttled by each power. While he did not achieve all his objectives, the three naval
powers—the United States, Great Britain, and Japan—agreed to drastically reduce
their fleets. As late as 1935, FDR hailed this achievement as “the first important
voluntary agreement for limitation and reduction of armament. It stands out as a
milestone of civilization.”36 Hughes also understood the problems of war debts caused
by the Treaty of Versailles. He observed that “[w]e cannot dispose of these problems
by calling them European.”37
With Calvin Coolidge’s election in 1924, Hughes submitted his letter of
resignation. He was disappointed when it was accepted. Hughes again returned to a
“large, varied, and lucrative” practice of law where his yearly income was $400,000.38
When Coolidge announced he would not run for reelection, once again Hughes’s
name was mentioned. He issued a statement declining interest. To back it up, he
33.

Id. at 116.

34. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States 273 (1941).
35.

Simon, supra note 1, at 123.

36. Id. at 161.
37.

Id. at 164.

38. Id. at 172.
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declined (as he also had in 1920) the offer to deliver the keynote address at the
Republican convention (lest it lead to a draft). With Herbert Hoover’s election,
Hughes was offered his old job as Secretary of State, but, having accepted a two-year
appointment to the International Court of Justice, he declined.
Taft once again showed his respect for Hughes when, dying as Chief Justice, he
recommended to President Hoover that Hughes be nominated as Taft’s replacement.
At Hughes’s meeting with Hoover, Hughes put up arguments against the
appointment—including the fact that his son was Solicitor General. But Hoover
replied, “It is your duty to take it.”39 Hoover also assured Hughes there would be no
trouble with confirmation.
Hoover was wrong. Progressives forgot Hughes the investigator, the governor,
the Supreme Court Justice, but could not forget—or forgive—his paying clients.
George Norris claimed Hughes had the philosophy of his clients: “He looks through
glasses contaminated by the influence of monopoly as it seeks to get favors by means
which are denied to the common, ordinary citizen.”40 Southerners, by contrast,
remembered Hughes the Supreme Court Justice and his commitment to equal justice
for everyone. They joined Progressives in opposing Hughes, but he was still
confirmed by a 52–26 vote.
V. FDR and the Court, 1932–1936

In the closing days of the 1932 campaign, FDR noted that when the Depression
began Republicans were “in complete control of all branches of the federal
government.”41 He then ad-libbed “the Executive, the Senate, the House of
Representatives and, I might add for good measure, to make it complete, the Supreme
Court as well.”42 A day later, talking to Senator James Byrnes he reaffirmed his
statement with an indication of his concern. “[W]hatever is in a man’s heart is apt to
come out of his tongue—I shall not make any explanations or apology for it!”43 He
had reason for concern since there were four arch-conservatives on the Court who
viewed FDR, in the words of one of them, as “unfitted and unsafe for the presidency.”44
Yet Roosevelt knew and liked several of the Justices. Responding to Justice
Benjamin Cardozo’s congratulations, FDR replied “that he looked forward to the
same ‘delightful relations with the Supreme Court’ that he had enjoyed as governor
with the state’s highest court when Cardozo served as its chief judge.”45 During the
interregnum FDR received advice from Justice Louis D. Brandeis, who concluded
that FDR understood the challenges he faced. With Hughes, FDR noted that, in
39.

Id. at 175.

40. Id. at 178.
41.

Shesol, supra note 11, at 9.

42.

Id.

43.

Id. at 12.

44. Simon, supra note 1, at 245.
45.

Id. at 221.
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addition to “our long time friendship and to my admiration and respect for you, I
think it is interesting that a governor of New York is to administer the oath to
another governor of New York.”46
Initially FDR received the results of the Court with satisfaction—even if he did
remain wary. His last recorded comment on the Court until he was reelected was in
January 1936, and it is worth looking at his experiences in the two years preceding
that comment (which was made in private to his cabinet) that led him to be certain
the Court would nullify everything of significance.
The two key 1934 cases, Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell47 and Nebbia v.
New York,48 were examples of state experimentation in the face of the hard economic
times. Both were 5–4 victories for experimentation, with Hughes writing the former
and Owen Roberts, the true swing Justice, writing the latter. FDR stated that the
two cases gave him “a glimmer of hope that the Supreme Court would take a broad
view of the Constitution,” and that was the logical reading of the cases.49
FDR was undismayed when the government lost the Hot Oil Case in January
1935.50 He told reporters that the Court was just telling Congress to do a better job
drafting its legislation—again the most plausible reading of the case.
FDR had more trepidation about the Gold Clause Cases because the government
had repudiated its promise to pay off its bonds in gold.51 At oral argument, Attorney
General Homer Cummings told the Court the case was of “almost unprecedented
importance” as a loss would increase the national debt by $70 billion.52 Anticipating
a loss, FDR prepared a Fireside Chat wherein he would tell the American people
that he would not abide the decision because it would throw the nation into “an
infinitely more serious economic plight than we have yet experienced.”53
The Court, again by a 5–4 vote, sustained the government’s position on the
theory that while the plaintiffs were correct as a matter of constitutional law, it would
unjustly enrich them to be paid off in gold given its new dollar value. FDR was
euphoric. “As a lawyer it seems to me that the Supreme Court has at last definitely
put human values ahead of the ‘pound of flesh’ called for by a contract.”54
Any euphoria was short-lived and ended on Black Monday when the Court struck
down three New Deal measures, including its showcase statute, the National Industrial
46. Id. at 230.
47.

290 U.S. 398 (1934).

48. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
49. Simon, supra note 1, at 248.
50. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); see Simon, supra note 1, at 249–51.
51.

Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935);
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); see Simon, supra note 1, at 252–56.

52.

Powe, supra note 26, at 204.

53.

Id.

54. Simon, supra note 1, at 256–57.
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Recovery Act, which fell unanimously in Schechter Poultry v. United States.55 The Court
found an unconstitutional delegation, but went beyond that to conclude that chickens
sent from Pennsylvania to Manhattan and then resold to a Brooklyn processing plant
had ceased traveling in interstate commerce; hence any regulation exceeded
Congressional power. Counsel for the poultry company stated that if Congress could
regulate their business, then “Congress would soon be ‘in charge of all human activity.’”56
Naturally, FDR held a different view. After he digested the opinion, he delivered
his own biting dissent—which quickly became known as the “horse-and-buggy” attack
on the Court—for almost an hour and a half to about two hundred reporters. “The
implications of this decision are much more important than any decision probably since
the Dred Scott case.”57 He then asked rhetorically, “Does this decision mean that the
United States Government has no control over any national economic problem? . . .
[W]e have been relegated to the horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce.”58
In September 1935, an issue of the weekly Collier’s published an article by FDR’s
friend George Creel that stated:
It is the deep conviction of Franklin D. Roosevelt that the Constitution was
never meant to be a “dead hand,” chilling human aspiration and blocking
humanity’s advance, but that the founding fathers conceived it as a living
force for the expression of the national will with respect to national needs.59

It is for these reasons that, in January 1936 at a cabinet meeting, FDR predicted
doom by the Court.60
FDR’s prediction that everything of significance would be struck down looked
perfect as the Court took out the Agriculture Adjustment Act,61 the Guffey Coal
Act,62 and then for good measure reaffirmed that neither the states nor the federal
government had the power to mandate a minimum wage for women.63 This latter
decision was too extreme even for Republicans. The Party’s platform came out in
favor of state minimum wage laws and many conservative Republicans decried the
decision. Hamilton Fish (of Roosevelt’s (in)famous “Martin, Barton, and Fish”64), for
55.

295 U.S. 495 (1935).

56. Simon, supra note 1, at 262. Henry Stimson, the former Secretary of State, agreed. Id. at 267.
57.

Id. at 264.

58. Id.
59.

Id. at 269.

60. See id. at 284.
61.

See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).

62. See Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
63. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
64. David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–

1945, at 462 (1999). FDR reminded “audiences that [1940 Republican candidate Wendell] Wilkie’s
party was also the party of ‘Martin, Barton, and Fish,’ three notoriously isolationist congressmen whose
names formed a catchy trinomial chant with which Roosevelt worked Democratic crowds into paroxysms
of partisan enthusiasm.” Id.
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instance, claimed the decision was “a new Dred Scott . . . condemning millions of
Americans to economic slavery.”65
The 1936 decisions left the National Labor Relations Act, Social Security, and the
Tennessee Valley Authority ready for future slaying. Yet prior to his reelection FDR was
silent about the Court—except when talking to Attorney General Homer Cummings.66
After his landslide victory, FDR told a reporter for the New York Daily News that
a short holiday “will give me a chance to re-study the problem created for the Nation
by the Supreme Court.” He claimed it could be “solved without getting away from
our underlying principles.”67
VI.	The Court-Packing Battle

Early drafts of FDR’s State of the Union address “did not hide his hostility
toward the Court.”68 But the final draft concluded that “[w]e do not ask the Courts
to call non-existent powers into being, but we have a right to expect that conceded
powers or those legitimately implied shall be made effective instruments for the
common good.”69 Still, Roosevelt’s heart was with his early drafts. After his
inauguration, he told aide (and speechwriter) Samuel Rosenman that:
When the Chief Justice read me the oath and came to the words “support the
Constitution of the United States” I felt like saying, “Yes, but it’s the
Constitution as I understand it, flexible enough to meet any new problem of
democracy—not the kind of Constitution your Court has raised up as a
barrier to progress and democracy.” 70

Unbeknownst to anyone of importance—because FDR loved secrecy and
surprise—he and Cummings were about to spring the Court-packing plan, which
would add a new Justice to the Court for every Justice aged seventy or older who did
not retire. That would create six new Justices, so that by persuading any two of
Brandeis, Cardozo, or Harlan Fiske Stone (who was becoming increasingly bitter at
Hughes and the conservatives)71 to join with the new Justices, the New Deal could be
assured of eight votes for a majority of his packed Court.
As is well known, FDR fumbled his opening kickoff on the Court-packing plan.
He had consulted no one but Cummings and laid no legislative groundwork for
passing the plan. Furthermore, his initial justifications for adding new Justices—
65.

Powe, supra note 26, at 207.

66. Cummings was an early FDR supporter and during the course of FDR’s first term “he had demonstrated

a trained eye for political advantage and an insatiable drive to find a practical solution for the president’s
Court problem.” Simon, supra note 1, at 308.

67.

Id. at 298.

68. Id. at 310.
69. Id. at 311.
70. Samuel I. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt 144 (1952).
71.

The Washington Post noted that when Stone read his dissent in the AAA case, “[t]here was bitterness,
too, and scorn. You could not miss it.” Simon, supra note 1, at 281.
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infirmities of age and the need for efficiency—were disingenuous (and wrong on the
evidence, as Hughes would soon demonstrate). Concluding that a seventy-year-old
Justice was “losing it” was a frontal attack on two progressive icons—the now
deceased Holmes and the very much alive eighty-year-old Brandeis. In a Fireside
Chat, FDR moved to the truth: The Court needed an infusion of new Justices in
tune with the spirit of the age (i.e., New Dealers).
There was no groundswell of support for the plan, which was, after all, a direct
attack on the independence of the judiciary and was not offered as a constitutional
amendment. But with 3–1 Democratic margins in both the House and the Senate,
FDR thought he could push it through over any opposition. Republicans were aghast
but numbered too few to matter. And Democrats concerned with civil liberties
(issues on which the Court was better than any of its recent predecessors72) were
unhappy with an attack on the judiciary at a time when civil liberties were already
extinguished in Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy.
The two people most responsible for defeating the plan were Senator Burton
Wheeler and Hughes. Wheeler, a Montana Democrat progressive who felt
unappreciated by an administration he had wholeheartedly supported, came out quickly
against the plan and gained the invaluable assistance of Hughes. The Chief Justice
declined to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee, but did offer to write a letter
to the committee that Wheeler could use when he testified. When Wheeler arrived at
Hughes’s residence on the Sunday before Wheeler was to testify, Hughes handed him
a seven-page letter and, with a big smile, stated, “The baby is born.”73
Hughes’s letter, which Wheeler then read to the committee, declined to speak to
the merits of FDR’s plan—and then did just that. He noted that the Court was fully
abreast of its work and that creating additional Justices could, and likely would, make
the Court less efficient. The letter was signed by the two most senior associate
Justices—Justice Brandeis, a liberal, and Justice Willis Van Devanter, a conservative.
This offered the impression that all of the Justices agreed with it (which was not
accurate, since Stone considered it a high-handed tactic).
The letter alone could not defeat the plan, but Hughes had plenty more. A week
later, the Court handed down West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, upholding a state minimum
wage law for women and specifically overruling the prior Term’s contrary holding.74
Over the next seven weeks the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act75 and
the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Security Act,76 and Van
Devanter announced his retirement. Yet FDR refused to compromise, even though
the Senate majority leader stated that he could have easily gotten the President three
72. By the end of the 1935 Term, the Court had decided Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Near
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new Justices.77 FDR, however, wanted six and went down in his most decisive defeat,
one that broke the back of the New Deal. As FDR’s second vice president, Henry
Wallace, observed, “The whole New Deal really went up in smoke as a result of the
Supreme Court fight.” 78
The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee put the lie to FDR’s claim that he
could solve the problem without doing damage to “our underlying principles.” 79 The
Court-packing plan’s “ultimate purpose would be to make this government one of
men rather than one of law . . . . It is a measure which should be so emphatically
rejected that its parallel will never again be presented to the free representatives of
the free people of America.”80
VII. Why the Switch?

The three decisions announced after the Court-packing plan, West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, NLRB v. Jones, and Steward Machine v. Davis, undid the three comparable
decisions of the prior Term. They did so by 5–4 votes, with Roberts switching
positions—hence T.R. Powell’s label of “the switch in time that saves nine.” 81
It is clear that the Court-packing plan itself was not the cause of Roberts’s switch.
Roberts voted to support the minimum wage in West Coast Hotel weeks prior to the
announcement of the plan.
With what once was the prime explanation debunked, there are two competing
theories for the change, and Simon wisely avers to both. The internalist theory,
championed by Barry Cushman82 and G. Edward White,83 is that the statutes passed
during the Hundred Days84 were so hastily drafted that they almost invited
invalidation—consider the overwhelming votes in the Hot Oil Case and Schechter
Poultry, demonstrating that better drafting meant better laws. Furthermore,
lawyering got better with experience, assisting Justices (i.e., Roberts) in better
understanding the needs of a modern age.
In contrast to this internalist theory, the alternative is that the external political
pressure to do something about the Court was becoming so great that, even before
the Court-packing plan, Roberts had come to understand the Court had overstepped
what was possible in a democratic society. Hughes believed that “[t]his Court was
77.
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81.

Solomon, supra note 11, at 162 (quoting it as “serves nine” rather than “saves nine”).

82. See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional

Revolution (1998).

83. See G. Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal (2000).
84. See Jonathan Alter, The Defining Moment: Fdr’s Hundred Days and the Triumph of Hope

(2006); Adam Cohen, Nothing to Fear: Fdr’s Inner Circle and the Hundred Days that
Created Modern America (2009).

477

TWO GREAT LEADERS

N

under attack, it seemed, from all directions.”85 This was underscored when the 1936
election once again showed that FDR was a President with a mandate to continue
the New Deal. This explains why I subscribe to the externalist theory.86
Simon appears to be a fellow traveler. He tellingly recounts the story of Hughes
and his wife returning from their 1936 summer vacation and stopping off at Roberts’s
country estate in rural Pennsylvania. The visit lasted twenty-four hours, but the two
men spent many hours alone talking—“intense conversation” is the characterization.87
Mrs. Roberts stated that the men’s time alone was so lengthy that she and Mrs.
Hughes “got to the end of our rope.” 88 What the two Justices talked about is
unknown, but Simon implies that it was about the Court being in an untenable
position in its opposition to the popular New Deal—a position, at least on state
minimum wages for women, that even the Republican Party was repudiating.
Simon quite properly relied on the major New Deal historian William E.
Leuchtenburg for the story of the farm meeting.89 Leuchtenburg, in turn, relies on an
oral history by FDR’s Labor Secretary Frances Perkins. The problem here, as Barry
Cushman points out (subsequent to Simon’s publication),90 is that Perkins is referring
to a visit in 1935—not 1936.91 Somehow Leuchtenburg erred, and that caused Simon
to emphasize a point that does not help his argument. Maybe this could cause him to
abandon the externalist view—even as it does not affect my own belief in that theory
based on the criticisms of the Court for overreaching and capped by the New Deal’s
landslide victory in the 1936 elections.
VIII. Hughes and Stone

In retrospect, Hughes comes across as a great leader. FDR’s appointees all
admired him. His initial kindnesses to both Hugo Black (who had voted against
confirming Hughes and had come to the Court with the stain of his Ku Klux Klan
membership exposed) and Felix Frankfurter won them over. William O. Douglas
admired Hughes’s intellect and efficiency;92 throughout my clerkship, he never spoke
to me more highly of another Justice than he did of Hughes. When Douglas was
angling for the vice presidency in 1944, he used Hughes as his model so that if the
call came it would be perceived as a draft.
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The Justices discussed and argued cases for hours each Saturday. Hughes came
meticulously prepared, talking first, and stating the facts and what he deemed to be
the salient points of law. Unlike some proselytizing Justices, this presentation was
the only time Hughes tried to sway the others (which is a reason to believe Hughes
did not strong-arm Roberts to change his position on the New Deal). Yet by 1936
there was a belief that Hughes could not lead because of the fractured nature of the
Court, and the liberal Republican Harlan Fiske Stone (with the assistance of thenHarvard Professor Felix Frankfurter) voiced this view with consistency. Stone’s
relationship with Hughes was always fraught. Stone, a friend of Hoover, believed
that Hoover should have chosen him as the Chief Justice to succeed Taft. Not only
did Taft think highly of Hughes, but he also likely wished to persuade Hoover not to
select Stone, whom Taft believed was “not a leader, and would have a great deal of
trouble in massing the court.”93 That, of course, was not Stone’s view; he thought he
could do a better job leading the Court, and he viewed the conservative opinions as
a failure of Hughes’s leadership.
If achieving lopsided victories in contentious cases is a measure of leadership,
then Hughes mostly failed. The conservatives could never be reconciled with the
New Deal, and so overwhelming votes could occur only when the liberals felt there
was government overreaching; they rarely had that feeling. If Stone thought he could
have done better, he was living in a dream world.
Stone’s chaotic and unsatisfying years as Chief Justice on a Court loaded with
Roosevelt appointees shine an unfortunate light on his resentment of Hughes. With the
war pending and only Democrats nominated to the Court, FDR promoted Stone, a
Republican, to replace Hughes as Chief Justice. Under Stone, conferences became
interminable because he believed Hughes had run too tight a ship. According to Douglas:
[The] Stone method killed Stone. He would start the conference at the
beginning at twelve o’clock. He would state his views on a case. He would not
only take up the main point, but he would take up the five or six or seven
collateral points that Hughes would always say that we can leave . . . to the
writer of the opinion. And he would discuss them with a thoroughness of
which a professor in . . . law school of the first-year class might proceed.94

Stone’s inability to handle his strong-willed brethren—Black, Douglas,
Frankfurter, Robert Jackson—is legendary. Chief Justice John Marshall may have
been able to suppress dissents, but from the New Deal forward, no Chief Justice ever
could. Hughes did the best that anyone could, and when the independence of the
Supreme Court was threatened, he knew how to lead and how to win, as Simon and
his contemporaries, Burt Solomon and Jeff Shesol, show.95
93.

Simon, supra note 1, at 174.

94. Transcripts of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor Walter F. Murphy, Seeley G.

Mudd Manuscript Libr. Princeton U., (Dec. 20, 1961), http://www.Princeton.edu/-mudd/
finding_aids/douglas/douglas2.html. I recall Douglas, who had been a student in Stone’s property class,
saying he dealt with cases at conference like he did in class. If a case had twelve issues, eleven of them
frivolous, Stone treated them all equally.

95. See Solomon, supra note 11; Shesol, supra note 11.

479

TWO GREAT LEADERS
IX.	The Personal Aftermath

Both FDR and Hughes were politicians, meaning that their battle over the
Court-packing plan had been business, but nothing personal.96 Thus, with the battle
behind them, they resumed their cordial relationship. Hughes and his wife were
invited to a 1939 State Dinner for King George VI and his wife, but Hughes had to
back out for a medical reason. Roosevelt then personally called Mrs. Hughes to
express his regrets that the Chief Justice could not attend and urged her to attend
because, he promised, she would be seated next to the King. She did, and she was.
In 1940, Hoover asked Hughes to resign so that Hughes could campaign against
FDR. Hughes declined. At a dinner before the third inauguration, Hughes was
overheard telling Roosevelt, “I hope you won’t mind, after I administer the oath to
you the third time, if I lean over and quietly ask, ‘Governor is this getting to be a
habit?’”97 Both men then enjoyed a good laugh.
Although Theodore Roosevelt thought that Hughes was a “bearded iceberg,” 98
the more common (albeit later) assessment was that of Justice Robert Jackson, who
claimed Hughes “look[ed] like God and talk[ed] like God.”99 Both characterizations
were apt, but so was FDR’s characterization of Hughes in the wake of the Courtpacking plan: Hughes “was the best politician in the country.”100
As H.W. Brands demonstrates, FDR became a great President when he became
a great world leader during World War II.101 Hughes’s greatness came earlier. Their
conjoining in a readable dual biography is a fine and worthy accomplishment.
X. CONCLUSION

Simon’s three books on Presidents and Chief Justices have featured great and
transformative Presidents, but the current book is separated from its predecessors by
the extraordinary career of Hughes. Roger Taney had no national elective career, and
while John Marshall was an outstanding politician, he could never have been elected
President. Hughes, however, almost won the presidency in 1916, and he would have
won in 1920 had he wished to seek the Republican nomination. Although he was
never president, he had a deservedly towering stature. This made him close to FDR’s
equal, and their intertwining story is nothing short of compelling. Having seized on
the story, Simon makes the most of it.
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